Clearing — Payment Netting & Interbank Settlement Preparation
Clearing is the process of reconciling and netting payment obligations between financial institutions before final settlement occurs. It sits between a payment being authorised and money actually moving between bank accounts at the central bank.
Key distinction: Clearing = calculating who owes whom. Settlement = the actual money movement.
Why Clearing Exists
If every payment triggered an immediate bilateral transfer of central bank money, the system would be impossibly inefficient:
- Bank A sends 10,000 payments to Bank B
- Bank B sends 9,800 payments to Bank A
- Without clearing: 19,800 gross transfers
- With clearing: 1 net transfer of the residual difference
Clearing nets these obligations down to a single net position per bank per settlement cycle.
DNS vs RTGS — The Two Clearing Models
Deferred Net Settlement (DNS)
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| How it works | All payments are batched; obligations are netted at end of a cycle |
| Settlement frequency | Once or several times per day (e.g. BECS: 3 settlement windows) |
| Liquidity requirement | Only net positions need to be funded |
| Risk | If a participant fails before settlement, all obligations unwind — systemic risk |
| Cost | Low — efficient use of liquidity |
| Examples | BECS Direct Entry, BPAY, VISA/Mastercard daily nets |
Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| How it works | Each payment is settled individually, in real time |
| Settlement frequency | Continuous, payment by payment |
| Liquidity requirement | Full face value must be available at time of instruction |
| Risk | Very low — each payment is final on settlement |
| Cost | Higher liquidity cost |
| Examples | NPP (via FSS), RTGS/HVCS (RITS), SWIFT (via correspondent nostros) |
Australian Clearing Systems
BECS (Bulk Electronic Clearing System)
Operated by AusPayNet, BECS handles bulk batch payments:
| Detail | Value |
|---|---|
| Payment types | Direct Entry credits, direct debits |
| File format | 120-character fixed-width DE file |
| Timing | D+0 submission, D+1 value (next business day) |
| Settlement windows | 3 per day via RBA RTGS |
| Scheme rules | AusPayNet BECS Procedures |
| Participants | ADIs (banks, credit unions, building societies) |
BECS Clearing Cycle
Originator (batch file)
│
▼ Submit DE file before cut-off
Originating ADI
│
▼ Send file to Clearing House (AusPayNet/BECS)
BECS Clearing House
│
├─► Net obligations calculated per ADI pair
│
▼ Settlement instructions sent to RBA
RBA RTGS / ESA
│
▼ Net positions settled
Receiving ADIs
│
▼ Credit entries posted to customer accounts
BPAY Clearing
- Operated by BPAY Group
- Payments submitted via participating financial institutions
- Batched and netted daily
- Settlement via RITS/RBA
NPP Fast Settlement Service (FSS)
- Operated by NPPA via RBA FSS
- RTGS-based: each NPP payment settles individually and immediately
- No netting — each instruction is final
- Available 24/7/365
HVCS / RITS (High-Value Clearing System)
- Operated by RBA via RITS (Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System)
- High-value and time-critical domestic AUD payments
- RTGS — payment by payment
- Typically used for large corporate/treasury payments (>$250K rule of thumb)
Multilateral Netting — How it Works
In DNS clearing, all banks' positions are netted multilaterally:
Bank A → Bank B: $1,000,000
Bank B → Bank A: $600,000
Bank A → Bank C: $400,000
Bank C → Bank A: $200,000
Bank B → Bank C: $100,000
After multilateral netting:
Bank A: net position = -$1,000,000 - $400,000 + $600,000 + $200,000 = -$600,000 (net PAYER)
Bank B: net position = +$1,000,000 - $600,000 - $100,000 = +$300,000 (net RECEIVER)
Bank C: net position = +$400,000 - $200,000 + $100,000 = +$300,000 (net RECEIVER)
Total net transfers: 3 (instead of 5 gross)
Intraday Liquidity Implications
Clearing models directly drive liquidity strategy:
DNS Liquidity
- Banks must fund their end-of-cycle net position only
- Intraday liquidity can be recycled — received payments can fund outgoing obligations
- Risk: if inflows don't arrive before cut-off, bank must draw on credit facility or ESA
RTGS Liquidity
- Each payment consumes full face value from the ESA immediately
- Bank must prefund or actively manage ESA throughout the day
- RITS provides intraday repo (collateral against RBA) to manage peaks
Gridlock Resolution
In RTGS systems, gridlock can occur when multiple banks are simultaneously waiting for inbound funds before they can settle outbound payments — a circular dependency.
RITS uses SWIFT's LSM (Liquidity Saving Mechanism):
- Payments queue in RITS
- LSM runs bilateral and multilateral offset algorithms
- Circular dependencies are detected and resolved by simulating simultaneous settlement
- Only residual net positions require actual liquidity
Clearing vs Settlement Summary
| Stage | Clearing | Settlement |
|---|---|---|
| When | During payment processing | End of cycle (DNS) or immediately (RTGS) |
| What happens | Obligations calculated and netted | Central bank money transfers between ESAs |
| Who does it | Clearing houses (AusPayNet, NPPA, BPAY) | RBA (RITS/FSS) |
| Reversibility | Positions can still change | Final and irrevocable |
| Risk | Systemic (DNS only) | Eliminated at settlement |
Clearing Cut-Off Times (BECS — Indicative)
| Window | Submission Deadline | Settlement Time |
|---|---|---|
| Morning | Prior evening/night file | 8:30 AM |
| Afternoon | Mid-morning | 1:30 PM |
| Evening | Afternoon | 6:00 PM |
Exact times set by AusPayNet and subject to change. Check current AusPayNet BECS Procedures.
Engineering Notes
// Conceptual: calculating net position per bank pair
Map<String, BigDecimal> netPositions = payments.stream()
.collect(Collectors.groupingBy(
p -> p.getSenderBic() + "_" + p.getReceiverBic(),
Collectors.reducing(BigDecimal.ZERO, Payment::getAmount, BigDecimal::add)
));
// Net: A→B $1M, B→A $600K → one net settlement of A paying B $400K
- Store clearing obligations in an immutable ledger — never modify posted obligations
- Track clearing cycle state machine:
SUBMITTED → NETTED → SETTLED - Implement idempotent settlement status updates (network retries)
- Publish clearing position events for real-time monitoring
Interview Questions
Q: What is the main systemic risk of DNS and how is it mitigated?
If a participant fails before settlement, all obligations of that participant must be unwound, potentially cascading to other participants. Mitigated via: loss-sharing agreements, default funds, collateral requirements, position limits, and central bank liquidity backstops.
Q: Why don't all payments use RTGS if it has lower settlement risk?
RTGS requires full liquidity for every payment immediately, which is expensive. DNS is far more liquidity-efficient (only net positions need funding). Most retail-volume, lower-value payments use DNS because the systemic risk is managed through scheme rules rather than eliminated through immediate settlement.
NPP is unique in being both a real-time customer experience (instant credit) AND RTGS settlement (via RBA FSS). Most other real-time payment systems globally use DNS with deferred settlement — NPP's architecture eliminates the gap.
